Many approaches focus on detecting dense blocks in the tensor of multimodal data to prevent fraudulent entities (e.g., accounts, links) from retweet boosting, hashtag hijacking, link advertising, etc. However, no existing method is effective to find the dense block if it only possesses high density on a subset of all dimensions in tensors. In this paper, we novelly identify dense-block detection with dense-subgraph mining, by modeling a tensor into a weighted graph without any density information lost. Based on the weighted graph, which we call information sharing graph (ISG), we propose an algorithm for finding multiple densest subgraphs, D-Spot, that is faster (up to 11 x faster than the state-of-the-art algorithm) and can be computed in parallel. In an N-dimensional tensor, the entity group found by the ISG+D-Spot is at least 1/2 of the optimum with respect to density, compared with the 1/N guarantee ensured by competing methods. We use nine datasets to demonstrate that ISG+D-Spot becomes new state-of-the-art dense-block detection method in terms of accuracy specifically for fraud detection.
INTRODUCTION
Fraud represents a serious threat to the integrity of social or review networks such as Twitter and Amazon, with people introducing fraudulent entities (e.g., fake accounts, reviews, etc.) to gain more publicity/profit over a brief period. For example, on a social network or media sharing website, people may wish to enhance their account by illegally adding more followers [29] ; on e-commerce websites, fraudsters may register multiple accounts to benefit from "new user" promotions.
Consider the typical log data generated from a social review site (e.g., Amazon), which contains four-dimensional features: users, products, timestamps, rating scores. These data are often formulated as a tensor, in which each dimension denotes a separate feature and an entry (tuple) of the tensor represents a review action. Based on previous studies [13, 32] , fraudulent entities form dense blocks (subtensors) within the main tensor, such as when a mass of fraudulent * Yikun did the project during his visit at Tsinghua University.
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Various dense-block detection methods have been developed. One approach uses tensor decomposition, such as CP decomposition and higher-order singular value decomposition [21] . However, as observed in [34] , such methods are outperformed by search-based techniques [13, 32, 34] in terms of accuracy, speed, and flexibility regarding support for different density metrics. Furthermore, [32, 34] provide an approximation guarantee for finding the densest/optimal block in a tensor.
We have examined the limitations of search-based methods for dense-block detection. First, these methods are incapable to the detection of hidden-densest blocks. We define the hidden-densest block as one that does not have a high-density signal on all dimensions of a tensor, but evidently has a high density on a subset of all dimensions. Moreover, existing methods neglect the data type and distribution of each dimension on the tensor. Assume that two dense blocks A and B have the same density. However, A is the densest on a subset of critical features, such as IP address and device ID, whereas B is the densest on some trivial features such as age and gender. Can we simply believe that A is as suspicious as B? Unfortunately, the answer when using existing methods is 'yes. ' To address these limitations, we propose a dense-block detection framework. Compared with existing methods, this framework focuses on entities that form dense blocks on tensors. The proposed framework is designed using a novel approach. Given a tensor, the formation of dense blocks is the result of value sharing (the behavior whereby two or more different entries share a distinct value (entity) in the tensor). Based on this key point, we propose a novel Information Sharing Graph (ISG) model, which accurately captures each instance of value sharing. The transformation from dense blocks in a tensor to dense subgraphs in ISG leads us to propose a fast, high-accuracy algorithm, D-Spot, for determining fraudulent entities with a provable guarantee regarding the densities of the detected subgraphs.
In summary, the main contributions of this study are as follows: 1) [Graph Model]. We propose the novel ISG model, which converts every value sharing in a tensor to the representation of weighted edges or nodes. Furthermore, our graph model considers diverse data types and their corresponding distributions based on information theory, to automatically prioritize multiple features.
2) [Algorithm] . We propose the D-Spot algorithm, which is able to find multiple densest subgraphs in one run. And we theoretically prove that the multiple subgraphs found by D-Spot must contain some subgraphs that are at least 1/2 as dense as the optimum. In realworld graphs, D-Spot is up to 11× faster than the state-of-the-art competing algorithm.
3) [Effectiveness]. In addition to dense blocks, ISG+D-Spot also effectively differentiates hidden-densest blocks from normal ones. In an N-dimensional tensor, the entity group found by the ISG+D-Spot is at least 1/2 of the optimal group regarding density, compared with the 1/N guarantee ensured by competing methods. In experiments using eight public real-world datasets, ISG+D-Spot detected fraudulent entities more accurately than conventional methods.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Economics of Fraudsters
As most fraudulent schemes are designed for financial gain, it is essential to understand the economics behind the fraud. Only when the benefits to a fraudster outweigh their costs will they perform a scam.
To maximize profits, fraudsters have to share/multiplex different resources (e.g., fake accounts, IP addresses, and device IDs) over multiple frauds. For example, [14] found that many users are associated with a particular group of followers on Twitter; [38] identified many cases of phone number reuse; [4] observed that the IP addresses of many spam proxies and scam hosts fall into a few uniform ranges; and [40] revealed that fake accounts often conduct fraudulent activities over a short time period.
Thus, fraudulent activities often form dense blocks in a tensor (as described below) because of this resource sharing.
Related Work
Search-based dense-block detection in tensors. Previous studies [13, 21, 32] have shown the benefit of incorporating features such as timestamps and IP addresses, which are often formulated as a multi-dimensional tensor. Mining dense blocks with the aim of maximizing a density metric on tensors is a successful approach. CrossSpot [13] randomly chooses a seed block and then greedily adjusts it in each dimension until the local optimum is attained. This technique usually requires enormous seed blocks and does not provide any approximation guarantee for finding the global optimum. In contrast to adding feature values to seed blocks, MZoom [32] removes feature values from the initial tensor one by one using a similar greedy strategy, providing a 1/N -approximation guarantee for finding the optimum (where N is the number of dimensions in the tensor). M-Biz [33] also starts from a seed block and then greedily adds or removes feature values until the block reaches a local optimum. Unlike M-Zoom, D-Cube [34] deletes a set of feature values on each step to reduce the number of iterations, and is implemented in a distributed disk-based manner. D-Cube provides the same approximation guarantee as M-Zoom.
Tensor decomposition methods. Tensor decomposition [18] is often applied to detect dense blocks within tensors [21] . Scalable algorithms, such as those described in [25, 35, 39] , have been developed for tensor decomposition. However, as observed in [13, 34] , these methods are limited regarding the detection of dense blocks, and usually detect blocks with significantly lower densities, provide less flexibility with regard to the choice of density metric, and do not provide any approximation guarantee. 
Dense-subgraph detection. A graph matrix can be represented by a two-dimensional tensor, where an edge corresponds to a nonzero entry in the tensor. The mining of dense subgraphs has been extensively studied [19] . Detecting the densest subgraph is often formulated as finding the subgraph with the maximum average degree, and may use exact algorithms [11, 17] or approximate algorithms [6, 17] . Fraudar [12] is an extended approximate algorithm that can be applied to fraud detection in social or review graphs. CoreScope [31] tends to find dense subgraphs in which all nodes have a degree of at least k. Implicitly, singular value decomposition (SVD) also focuses on dense regions in matrixes. EigenSpoke [26] reads scatter plots of pairs of singular vectors to find patterns and chip communities, [8] extracts dense subgraphs using a spectral cluster framework, and [15, 29] use the top eigenvectors from SVD to identify abnormal users.
Other anomaly/fraud detection methods The use of belief propagation [3, 24] and HITS-like ideas [9, 10, 14] is intended to catch rare behavior patterns in graphs. Belief propagation has been used to assign labels to the nodes in a network representation of a Markov random field [3] . When adequate labeled data are available, classifiers can be constructed based on multi-kernel learning [2] , support vector machines [37] , and k-nearest neighbor [36] approaches.
DEFINITIONS AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we introduce the notation and definitions used throughout the paper, analyze the limitations of existing approaches, and describe our key motivations. A block B in R is defined as B(A 1 , ..., A N , X) = {t ∈ R : t[X ] ∈ X} and X ⊆ X . Additionally, the mass |B| is the number of tuples of B and B n is the set of distinct values of A n . Let B(a, A n ) = {t ∈ R : t[A n ] = a} represent all tuples that take the value a on A n . The mass |B(a, A n )| is the number of such tuples. Example 1 (Amazon review logs). Assume a relation R(user , product, timestamp, X ), where ∀t ∈ R, t = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , x) indicates a review action whereby user a 1 reviews product a 2 at timestamp a 3 , and the identification of the action is x. Because a 1 may review a 2 at a 3 (we assume that a 3 represents a period) multiple times, X helps us distinguish each such action. The mass of R, denoted by |R|, is the number of all review actions in the dataset. The number of distinct users in R is |R 1 |. A block B(a 1 , user ) is the set of all rating tuples operated by user a 1 , and the number of overall tuples of B(a 1 , user ) is |B(a 1 , user )|.
Notation and Formulations
First, we present a density metric that is known to be useful for fraud detection [32, 34] : Definition 1. (Arithmetic Average Mass ρ). Given a block B(A 1 , ..., A N , X), the arithmetic average mass of a block B with N dimensions is
Other density metrics listed in [34] are also effective for fraud detection. It is broadly true that all density measures are functions of the cardinalities of the dimensions and masses of B and R. In the remainder of this paper, we use the density metric ρ to illustrate our key points.
Previous studies [13, [32] [33] [34] have focused on detecting the top-k densest blocks in R, thus providing a 1 N -Approximation accuracy guarantee that the detected block is at least 1/N of the optimum in terms of ρ(B, N ). The densest block is defined as: N ) is the maximal value of all ρ(B ′ , N ), where B ′ is any possible block in R.
Shortcomings of Existing Approaches and Motivation
In practice, the blocks formed by fraudulent entities in R may be described by hidden-densest blocks. To illustrate hidden-densest blocks, we present the following definitions and examples. Definition 3. In R(A 1 , ..., A N , X ), we say that B(A 1 , ..., A N , X) is the densest on a dimension A n if ρ(B, n) is the maximal value of all possible ρ(B, n), whereB is any possible block in R. Thus, catching hidden-densest blocks has significant utility in the real world. Unfortunately, the problem is intractable using existing approaches [13, [32] [33] [34] .
First, assuming that the hidden-densest block B(A 1 , ..., A N , X) is only the densest on dimension A N , we have that
when N is sufficiently large. As ρ(B, N ) is very low, the methods in [13, [32] [33] [34] , which try to find the block B that maximizes ρ(B, N ), have a limited ability to detect the hidden-densest block. Second, consider a block B formed by fraudulent entities, in which B is only the densest on {A 2 , A 3 , A 5 }, and thus ρ(B, {2, 3, 5}) is maximal. However, the techniques of [13, [32] [33] [34] [Value Sharing]. Based on the above considerations, we design our approach from a different angle. The key reason behind the formation of dense blocks is value sharing. Given t 1 ∈ R, a dimension A n , and t 1 [A n ] = a, we can identify value sharing when ∃t 2 ∈ R and t 2 [A n ] = a.
Obviously, if a block B is dense, ρ(B, N ) > 1.0, then value sharing must be occurring, i.e., value sharing results in dense blocks.
Therefore, detecting dense blocks is equivalent to catching value sharing signals. We propose ISG based on information theory and design the D-Spot algorithm to leverage graph features, allowing us to catch fraudulent entities within dense blocks and overcome the limitations mentioned above.
ISG BUILDING
In this section, we present the Information Sharing Graph (ISG), which is constructed on the relation R. Moreover, we propose an optimization algorithm to reduce the complexity of building the ISG. In Section III.C, we elaborate on the representation of fraud groups consisting of fraudulent entities in the ISG, which paves the way for designing algorithms to capture fraudulent groups.
Problem Formulation
Catching fraudulent entities is equivalent to detecting a subset of distinct values in a certain dimension. Let U denote the target dimension in which a subset of distinct values form the fraudulent entities we wish to detect. In R = (A 1 , ..., A N , X ), we choose a dimension and set it as U , and denote the remaining (N − 1) dimensions as K dimensions, k ∈ [K], for brevity. We build the ISG of U , i.e., the weighted-undirected graph G = (V, E), in which V = {u 1 , ..., u n } is the set of distinct values of U .
In Example 1, R(user , product, timestamp, X ), we set U = user if we wish to detect fraudulent user accounts. In Example 2, we set U = account if we would like to identify fake accounts. In Example 3, we set U = connection to catch malicious connections.
To specifically describe the process of value sharing, we present the following two definitions:
Definition 5. (Pairwise Value Sharing). Given u i , u j ∈ V and a ∈ A k , we say that u i and u j share value a on
Pairwise value sharing occurs when a distinct value is shared by multiple individual entities. Given a value sharing process in which a is shared by V ∈ V, we denote this as
pairwise value sharing.
Another type of value sharing occurs when the distinct value a is shared n times by some entity u i , which can be represented by n instances of self-value sharing.
In ISG G = (V, E), for some edge (u i , u j ) ∈ E, S i, j represents the information between u i and u j derived from the other K dimensions, and for some node u i ∈ V, S i denotes the information of u i calculated from the other K dimensions. From the definitions and notation defined in the previous section, Problem 1 gives a formal definition of how to build the ISG of a tensor. Problem 1 (Building a pairwise information graph). (1) Input: a relation R, the target dimension U , (2) Output: the information sharing graph G = (V, E).
Building an ISG
Given a dimension A k , the target dimension U , any u i ∈ V, and a tuple t 1 ∈ R for which t 1 [U ] = u i , then for each a ∈ A k , we assume that the probability of
Edge Construction. Based on information theory [30] , the selfinformation of the event that u i and u j share a is:
To compute the pairwise value sharing between u i and u j across all K dimensions, we propose the metric S-score:
where H k (u i , u j ) is the set of all values shared by u i and
Intuitively, if u i and u j do not have any shared values, which is to be expected in normal circumstances, we have zero information. Otherwise, we obtain some information. Thus, the higher the value of S i, j , the more similar u i is to u j . In practice, the S-score has a large variance. For example, user pairs sharing an IP subnet and device ID will have a high S-score, whereas normal users are unlikely to share these values with anyone, and will thus have an S-score close to zero. Additionally, the information we obtain for u i and u j sharing the value a is related to the overall probability of that value. For example, it would be much less surprising if they both follow Donald Trump on Twitter than if they both follow a relatively unknown user. Node Setting. For a node u i ∈ V, we write B(a, A k , u i , U ) to represent the set of all such entries {t ∈ R :
We now define S i to compute the self-value sharing for u i across all K dimensions:
where
In effect, self-value sharing occurs in certain fraud cases. For instance, a fraudulent user may create several fake reviews for a product/restaurant on Amazon/Yelp [27] over a few days. In terms of network attacks [20] , a malicious TCP connection tends to attack a server multiple times. Determining [ p k (a) ]. We can extend the S-score to accommodate different data types and distributions.
It is difficult to determine p k (a), as we do not always know the distribution of A k . In this case, for dimensions that are resource features, we assume a uniform distribution and simply set
This approximation works well for many fraud-related properties such as IP subnets and device IDs, which usually follow a Poisson distribution [13] . However, the uniform assumption works poorly for low-entropy distributions, such as the long-tail distribution, which is common in dimensions such as items purchased or users followed. Low entropy implies that many users behave similarly anyway, independent of frauds. Intuitively for such distributions, there is no surprise in following a celebrity (head of the distribution), but considerable information if they both follow someone at the tail. For example, 20% of users correspond to more than 80% of the "follows" in online social networks. The dense subgraphs between celebrities and their fans are very unlikely to be fraudulent. If mode k has a long-tail distribution, its entropy is very low. For example, the entropy of the uniform distribution over 50 values is 3.91, but the entropy of a long-tail distribution with 90% of probabilities centered around one value is only 0.71. Therefore, we set p k (a) based on the empirical distribution as:
when the values in A k have low entropy. We also provide an interface so that users can define their own p k (a) function. Optimization of ISG construction. In theory, a graph with |V| nodes has O(|V| 2 ) edges. Naively, therefore, it takes O(|V| 2 ) time for graph initialization and traversal.
To reduce the complexity of building the ISG, we use the keyvalue approach. The key corresponds to a value a on A k and the value represents the block B(a, A k ). Let V ⊆ V denote the entities that occur in B(a, A k ). As each pair (u i , u j ) ∈ V share a, we increase the value of S i, j by I k i, j (a)
To build the ISG, we compute all key-value pairs across K dimensions by traversing R in parallel. Thus, it takes O(K |R| + |E|) time to build the graph G = (V, E). Note that we only retain positive S i, j and S i . In practice, G is usually sparse, which is discussed in Section 6.1.
Key Observations on ISG
Given a relation R = (A 1 , ..., A N , X ) in which we set U = A N , we construct the ISG of U , G = (V, E). Assuming there is a fraudulent block B in R, B = (A 1 , ..., A N , X) is transformed into a subgraph G in G, G = (V, E), where V is the set of distinct values of A N and an edge S i, j ∈ E denotes the information between u i and u j calculated from the other K dimensions. Then, V is the fraud group comprised of fraudulent entities that we wish to detect.
We summarize three critical observations of G that directly lead to the algorithms presented in Section IV. Given G = (V, E), we define the edge density of G as
1) The value of S i, j or S i is unusually high. Value sharing may happen, but sharing across certain dimension features, even certain values, is more suspicious than for others. Intuitively, it might be suspicious if two users share an IP address or follow the same random "nobody" on Twitter. However, it is not so suspicious if they have a common gender, city, or follow the same celebrity. In other words, certain value sharing is likely to be fraudulent because the probability of sharing across a particular dimension, or at a certain value, is quite low. Thus, the information value is high, which is accurately captured by S i, j and S i . 2) |V | is usually large. Fraudsters perform the same actions many times to achieve economies of scale. Thus, we expect to find multiple pairwise complicities among fraudsters. A number of studies have found that large cluster sizes are a crucial indicator of fraud [5? ]. Intuitively, while it is natural for a few family members to share an IP address, it is highly suspicious when dozens of users share one.
3) The closer ρ edдe (G) is to 1.0, the more suspicious is G. Fraudsters usually operate a number of fraudulent accounts for the same job, and thus it is likely that users manipulated by the same fraudster will share the same set of values. Thus, the G formed by the fraud group will be well-connected. Appearance of legitimate entities on ISG. In G = (V, E), given some u i that we assume to be legitimate, let h(u i ) denote the set of its neighbor nodes. We have two findings. (1) For u i , S i + ∀u j ∈V S i, j → 0 because u i is unlikely to share values with others.
If exists, the shared values should have a high probability (see observation 1). (2) The subgraph G induced by h(u i ) is typically not well-connected, as resource sharing is uncommon in the real world. If G is well-connected, |h(u i )| is quite small compared with the fraud group size (see observation 2).
In summary, the techniques described in [13, 21, [32] [33] [34] work directly on the tensor, indicating that they consider value sharing on each dimension, and even certain values, as equivalent. In contrast, ISG assigns each instance of value sharing a theoretical weight based on the edges and nodes of the ISG, which is more effective for identifying the (hidden-)densest blocks (comparison in Theorem 3).
SPOTTING FRAUD
Based on the observations in Section III.C, we now describe our method for finding objective subgraphs in G. The rest of this section is divided into two parts: first, we define a density metric F G , and then we illustrate the proposed D-Spot algorithm.
Density Metric and Problem Definition
To find the objective G = (V, E), we define a density metric F G as [7, 12] :
The form of F G satisfies the three key observations of G on G.
(1) Keeping |V | fixed, we have that In contrast, naive metrics that only consider one aspect of the graph features do not satisfy all three of these conditions. For example, the edge density ρ edдe (G) is not a good metric because it does not satisfy condition 2.
Thus, our subgraph-detection problem can be defined as follows: Problem 2 (Detecting dense subgraphs). (1) Input: the information sharing graph G = (V, E). (2) Find: multiple subgraphs of G that maximize F .
D-Spot (Algorithm 1-3)
In real-world datasets, there are usually numerous fraud groups forming multiple dense subgraphs. Based on the considerations described above, we propose D-Spot (Algorithms 1-3). Compared with other well-known algorithms for finding the densest subgraph [7, 12] , D-Spot has two advantages:
(1) D-Spot can detect multiple densest subgraphs simultaneously. D-Spot first partitions the graph, and then detects a single densest subgraph in each partition. Note that D-Spot also provides a 1/2-Approximation guarantee of finding the optimal solution, as proved in Section 6.3. Algorithm 1: graph partitioning. Let Gs denote the multiple partitions of G, andĜ be a dense subgraph in G that we are about to detect. Based on observation 1, the values of S i, j and/or S i inĜ should be greater than the values between legitimate nodes. In G, there are usually multipleĜs to be detected, where eachĜ should be independent or connected with others by small values of S i, j . Thus, we iterate through all edges in G, and remove those for which S i, j < θ (lines 2-4). We determine θ as a conservative threshold:
It is easy to see that θ is the average information of all possible pairs (u i , u j ). Let G ′ = (V ′ , E ′ ) be the result of filtering G. Then, Gs are the connected components of G ′ (line 5), and each G is expected to containĜ. For each G ∈ Gs, we run Algorithms 2 and 3 (lines 6-8) to find G. Finally, Algorithm 1 returns multiple dense subgraphsĜs (line 9). Note that there is a guarantee thatĜs must contain someĜ that is at least 1/2 of the optimum of G ′ in terms of F (proof in Section 6.3).
Algorithm 1 Find multiple dense subgraphs in G
Require: G = (V, E), θ (Eq.8 ), w() (Eq. 9) Ensure:Ĝs 1:Ĝs ← ∅ 2: for each S i, j ∈ E do 3:
if S i, j < θ then 4: remove S i, j 5: Gs ← connected components of G 6: for each G ∈ Gs do 7:Ĝ ← find a dense subgraph (G, w()) 8:Ĝs ←Ĝs ∪{Ĝ} 9: returnĜs Algorithms 2 and 3: find a dense subgraph. Given a subgraph G = (V, E), for some u i ∈ V, we define w(u i , G) as
Algorithms 2 and 3 are inspired by [7, 12] . Initially, V c ← V. In each iteration (lines 5-14), we delete a set of nodes (R, line 6) from V c until V c is empty. Of all the V c constructed during the execution of the algorithm, that which maximizes F (R, line 15) is returned as the output of the algorithm.
Lines 1-4 initialize the parameters used in the algorithm. Dict2 records the w value of each node. Dict1 records the order in which the nodes are deleted (line 10), which allows us to determine the value ofR that maximizes F . Line 6 determines which R are deleted in each iteration. R is confirmed by {u ∈ V : w(u, G) ≤ w } (line 6),
Algorithm 2 Find a dense subgraph
Require: G = (V, E), w()(Eq. 9) Ensure:
sort R in increasing order of Dict2[u]
8:
for each u ∈ R do 9:
10:
if F > F max then 13:
Dict2 ← updating edges (u, V c , Dict2, G) 16: returnĜ (the subgraph induced byR)
Algorithm 3 Updating edges
Require:
if (u i , u j ) ∈ E then 3:
remove (u i , u j ) from E
5: return Dict2
where the average w is given by:
because each edge S i, j is counted twice in u ∈V w(u, G). In lines 7-14, the nodes in R are removed from V c in each iteration ( [12] recomputes all nodes and finds those with the minimal w after deleting a node). As removing a subset of R may result in a higher value of F , D-Spot records each change of F , as if the nodes were removed one by one (lines [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Algorithm 3 describes how the edges are updated after a node is removed, requiring a total of |E | updates. Finally, Algorithm 2 returns the subgraphĜ induced byR, the set of nodes achieving F max , according to top and Dict1 (line 15).
Summary. As R contains at least one node, the worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|V | 2 + |E |). In practice, the worst case is too pessimistic. In line 6, R usually contains plenty of nodes, significantly reducing the number of scans of V c (see Section 7.2).
ANALYSIS 6.1 Complexity.
In the graph initialization stage, it takes O(K |R| + |E|) time to build G based on the optimization in Section 4.2. In D-Spot, the cost of partitioning G is O(|E|), and detecting a dense block in a partition G requires O(|E | + |V | 2 ) operations, where |E | << |E|, |V | << |V|. Thus, the complexity of ISG+D-Spot is linear with respect to |E|.
In the worst case, admittedly, |E| = |V| 2 when there is some dimension A k in which |R k | = 1. However, that is too pessimistic. In the target fraud attacks, fraud groups typically exhibit strong value sharing while legit entities should not. Hence, we expect G to be sparse because the u i only have positive edges with a small subset of V. We constructed a version of G using several real-world datasets (see Fig. 3 ), and the edge densities were all less than 0.06.
Furthermore, in R(A 1 , ..., A N , X ), dimension A n can be filtered out if |R n | is too low. As we assume that dimension A n follows a uniform distribution when |R n | is small, there is little information regarding value sharing on A n , and thus the dense blocks formed on A n are less suspicious (Eqs. 1-4). 
Effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot
Proof. Using the optimization algorithm in Section 4.2, we build G by scanning all values in R once. Hence, the block B(a, A k ) must be found. Let G = (V, E) be the subgraph induced by V in G. Then, ∀(u i , u j ) ∈ E, the edge S i, j ≥ I k i, j (a). Hence, ρ edдe (G) = 1.0
and In summary, Tensor+Other Algorithms vs. ISG+D-Spot corresponds to:
Therefore, ISG+D-Spot catches fraudulent entities within hiddendensest blocks more accurately than Tensor+Other Algorithms. □ From Observation, ISG+D-Spot can effectively detect hiddendensest blocks. Similarly, when B becomes denser, the G formed by B will also be much denser, and thus ISG+D-Spot will be more accurate in detecting the densest block.
Accuracy Guarantee of D-Spot
Let G ′ = (V ′ , E ′ ) be the result of deleting edges from G according to θ (see Algorithm 1). For brevity, we use [V] to denote a subgraph induced by the set of nodes V. Proof. Given any two sets of nodes V 1 and V 2 in which there are no edges connecting V 1 and V 2 , we assume that
Thus, for any V 1 and V 2 that are not connected by any edges, it follows that
, we useV to denote the set of nodes satisfyinĝ V ⊆ V n and F [V] = F opt n . Let V ′ be a set of nodes satisfying V ′ ⊂ V ′ and V ′ ∩V = ∅. Now, let us consider two conditions.
by Conclusion 1 and because F opt n is the maximum of {F opt 1 , ..., F opt n }.
If V ′ ∩ V n ∅, then V ′ can be divided into two parts conforming with the two conditions stated above.
Therefore,
. We can conclude that F Proof. Consider the optimal set Q * . We know that, ∀u ∈ Q * , w(u, [Q * ]) ≥ F [Q * ] (Eq. 7). Otherwise, if we remove a node u for which w(u, Q * ) < F [Q * ] ,
This contradicts the definition of Q * . Denote the first node that Algorithm 2 removes from Q * as u i , u i ∈ R, and denote the node set before Algorithm 2 starts removing . We conclude that
□
In summary, let {G 1 , ..., G n } be the subgraphs returned by DSpot, and {F G 1 , ..., F G n } be the corresponding scores. Then, based on Theorems 8 and 9, F max = max (F G 1 , . .., F G n ) is at least 1/2 of the optimum in terms of F on G ′ (1/2-Approximation guarantee).
EVALUATION
A series of evaluation experiments were conducted under the following conditions: Implementation. We implemented ISG+D-Spot in Python, and conducted all experiments on a server with two 2.20 GHz Intel(R) CPUs and 64 GB memory. Baselines. We selected several state-of-the-art dense-block detection methods (M-Zoom [32] , M-Biz [33] , and D-Cube [34] ) as the baselines (using open source code). To obtain optimal performance, we implemented three different density metrics from [34] : ρ (ari), Geometric Average Mass (geo), and Suspicious (sus). Table 3 summarizes the datasets used in the experiments. Synthetic is a series of datasets we synthesized using the same method as in [13] . First, we generated random seven-dimensional relations R(A 1 , ..., A 7 , X ), in which |R| = 10000 and the size of R is 1000 × 500×, ..., ×500. In R, we assume that A 1 corresponds to users and the other six dimensions are features. To specifically check the detection performance of the hidden-densest block using each method, we injected a dense block B(A 1 , ..., A 7 , X) into R five separate times, with each injection assigned a different configuration to generate five datasets. For B, |B 1 | = 50 and |B| = 500. We introduce the parameter λ, which denotes the number of dimensions on which B is the densest. For example, when λ = 1, the size of B is 50×12×25, ..., ×25; when λ = 5, the size of B is 50×12×, ..., × 12 ×25. Obviously, ρ(B, 7) > ρ(R, 7) and B is the hidden-densest block when λ is small. Finally, we labeled the users within B as "bad. "
Datasets
Amazon [16] . AmaOffice, AmaBaby, and AmaTools are three collections of reviews about office products, baby-related products, and tool products, respectively, on Amazon. They can be modeled using the relation R(user , product, timestamp, X ). For each entry t ∈ R, t = (u, p, t, x) indicates a review x that user u reviewed product p at time t. According to the specific cases of fraud discovered by previous studies [13, 40] , fraudulent groups usually exhibit suspicious synchronized behavior in social networks. For instance, a large group of users may surprisingly review the same group of products over a short period. Thus, we use a similar method as in [13, 32, 34, 40] . We use a dense block B to represent the synchronized behavior, where B(user , product, timestamp, X) has a size of 200 × 30 × 1. In total, we injected four such blocks B with a mass randomly selected from [1000, 2000] . The users in the injected blocks were labeled as "malicious. " Yelp [27] . The YelpChi, YelpNYU, and YelpZip datasets [23, 27] contain restaurant reviews submitted to Yelp. They can be represented by the relation R(users, restaurants, date, X ), where each entry t = (u, r , d, x) denotes a review x by user u of restaurant r on date d. Note that all three datasets include labels indicating whether or not each review is fake. The detection of malicious reviews or users is studied in [27] using text information. In these datasets, we focus on detecting fraudulent restaurants that purchase fake reviews using the three-dimensional features. Intuitively, the more fake reviews a restaurant has, the more suspicious it is. As some legitimate users are likely to review fraudulent restaurants, we label a restaurant as "fraudulent" if it has received more than 40 fake reviews. DARPA [20] was collected by the Cyber Systems and Technology Group in 1998 regarding network attacks in TCP dumps. The data has the form R(sourceIP, tarдetIP, timestamp, X ). Each entry t = (IP 1 , IP 2 , t) represents a connection made from IP 1 to IP 2 at time t. The dataset includes labels indicating whether or not each connection is malicious. In practice, the punishment for malicious connections is to block the corresponding IP address. Thus, we compared the detection performance of suspicious IP addresses. We labeled an IP address as suspicious if it was involved in a malicious connection. AirForce [1] was used for the KDD Cup 1999, and has also been considered in [32, 34] . This dataset includes a wide variety of simulated intrusions in a military network environment. However, it does not contain any specific IP addresses. According to the cardinality of each dimension, we chose the top-2 features and built the relation R(src bytes, dst bytes, connections, X ), where src bytes denotes the number of data bytes sent from source to destination and dst bytes denotes the number of data bytes sent from destination to source. The target dimension U was set to be connections. Note that this dataset includes labels indicating whether or not each connection is malicious. Suspiciousness Score Setting. For the baselines, we considered a detected block B(A 1 , ..., A N , X), where θ = ρ(B, N ). For any unique value a within B, we then set the suspiciousness score of a to θ . If a occurred in multiple detected dense blocks, we chose the one with the maximal value of θ . Regarding ISG+D-Spot, we assumed that a detected subgraphĜ = (V ,Ê). For a unique value a ∈V, we set the suspiciousness score of a to w(a,Ĝ) (Eq. 9). Finally, we 53k  160k  134k  Dimensions  7  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 evaluated the ranking of the suspiciousness scores of unique values using the standard area under the curve (AUC) metric.
Speed and Accuracy of D-Spot
First, we measured the speed and accuracy with which D-Spot detected dense subgraphs in real-world graphs. We compared the performance of D-Spot with that of another dense-subgraph detection algorithm, Fraudar [12] , which maximizes the density metric by greedily deleting nodes one by one. We used the three Amazon datasets and applied D-Spot and Fraudar to the same bipartite graph built on the first two dimensions, users and products, where each edge in the graph represents an entry. We measured the wallclock time (average over three runs) required to detect the top-4 subgraphs. Figure 2 illustrates the runtime and performance of the two algorithms. 
Effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot
This section illustrates the effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot for detecting fraudulent entities on multi-dimensional tensors. ISG+D-Spot exhibits extraordinary performance compared with the baseline methods. Synthetic. Table 4 presents the detection performance of each method for the hidden-densest block. We assume that the injected block B is the hidden-densest block when λ ≤ 3. In detail, ISG+D-Spot achieves extraordinary performance even when λ = 1, because each instance of value sharing in B is accurately captured by ISG and D-Spot, providing a higher accuracy guarantee than the baselines (Theorems 2 and 3). When λ > 3, the performance of each method improves because the density of B increases as λ increases. Amazon. Table 5 presents the results for catching suspicious users by detecting the top-4 dense blocks on the Amazon datasets. ISG+D-Spot detects synchronized behavior accurately. The typical attack scenario involves a mass of fraudulent users creating massive numbers of fake reviews for a comparatively small group of products over a short period. This behavior is represented by the injected blocks. ISG+D-Spot exhibits robust and near-perfect performance. However, the other baselines produce the worse performance on the AmaOffice and AmaBaby datasets, even with the multiple supported metrics. Yelp. Table 6 reports the (highest) accuracy with which collusive restaurants were detected by each method. In summary, using ISG+D-Spot results in the highest accuracy across all three datasets, because D-Spot applies a higher theoretical bounding to the ISG. DARPA. Table 7 lists the accuracy of each method for detecting the source IP and the target IP. ISG+D-Spot assigns each IP address a specific suspiciousness score. We chose the highest score and found that the corresponding IP participated in more than 1M malicious connections. The top ten suspicious IPs were all involved in more than 10k malicious connections. Thus, using ISG+D-Spot would enable us to crack down on these malicious IP addresses in the real world.
AirForce. As this dataset does not contain IP addresses, we set the target dimension U = connections. We randomly selected 30k connections from the dataset [1] by shuffling the data three times. Table 8 lists the accuracy of each method on shuffles 1-3. Malicious connections form dense blocks on the two-dimensional features. The results demonstrate that ISG+D-Spot effectively detected the densest blocks. 
Scalability
As mentioned in Section 6.1, the Gs built using real-world tensors are typically sparse, as value sharing should only conspicuously appear in fraudulent entities. We implemented G on the three Amazon datasets (details in Figure 3 ). The edge densities of G are quite low (lower than 0.06) across all datasets, which indicates that the worst-case time complexity discussed in Section 6.1 rarely occurs. 
Feature Prioritization
As mentioned earlier, finding the crucial features is complicated. In real-world datasets, there are always some noisy features in which all entities exhibit intense value sharing, masking the objects we wish to detect. ISG+D-Spot is more robust to resist noisy features than existing approaches. ISG automatically weights each feature and continuously accumulates value sharing by one scan of the tensor, and D-Spot amounts to finds entities with the maximum of value sharing. We conducted the following experiment to demonstrate our conclusion. Registration is a dataset derived from an e-commerce company. It contains over 26k user account registration logs. Each record contains two crucial features, IP subnet and phone prefix, and three noisy features, IP city, phone city, and timestamp. The dataset also includes labels showing whether or not the account is a "zombie" account. The dataset contains 16k good accounts and 10k bad accounts. Thus, it can be formulated as R(accounts, IP, phone, IP city, phone city, timestamp, X ). To compare the detection performance of malicious accounts, we applied each method on various R by successively appending 1-5 features to R(accounts, X ). Table 9 : Performance (AUC) on the Registration dataset. 'C' represents 'crucial feature' and 'N' represents 'noisy feature' 1C 2C 2C+1N 2C+2N 2C+3N Table 9 gives the variation of each method with regard to the added noisy features (3-5 dimensions). As each account only possesses one entry, R is quite sparse. We found that existing methods usually miss small-scale instances of value sharing because their density is close to the legitimate range on R. For example, a 51-member group sharing a single IP subnet was missed by the baseline methods. However, ISG amplifies each instance of value sharing through its information-theoretic and graph features, allowing DSpot to accurately capture fraudulent entities.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we novelly identified dense-block detection with dense-subgraph mining, by equivalently modeling a tensor. Additionally, we propose a multiple dense-subgraphs detection algorithm that is faster and can be computed in parallel. Our algorithms outperform competing methods over nine datasets, becoming the new state of the art. In future work, ISG + D-Spot will be implemented on Apache Spark [41] to apply to very large tensors.
